PREFACE
If there exists on any subject a philosophy (that is, a system
of rational knowledge based on concepts), then there must also be for this
philosophy a system of pure rational concepts, independent of any condition of
intuition, in other words, a metaphysic. It may be asked whether metaphysical
elements are required also for every practical philosophy, which is the doctrine
of duties, and therefore also for Ethics, in order to be able to present it as a
true science (systematically), not merely as an aggregate of separate doctrines
(fragmentarily). As regards pure jurisprudence, no one will question this
requirement; for it concerns only what is formal in the elective will, which has
to be limited in its external relations according to laws of freedom; without
regarding any end which is the matter of this will. Here, therefore, deontology
is a mere scientific doctrine (doctrina scientiae). *
* One who is acquainted with practical
philosophy is not, therefore, a practical philosopher. The latter is he who
makes the rational end the principle of his actions, while at the same time he
joins with this the necessary knowledge which, as it aims at action, must not be
spun out into the most subtile threads of metaphysic, unless a legal duty is in
question; in which case meum and tuum must be accurately determined in the
balance of justice, on the principle of equality of action and action, which
requires something like mathematical proportion, but not in the case of a mere
ethical duty. For in this case the question is not only to know what it is a
duty to do (a thing which on account of the ends that all men naturally have can
be easily decided), but the chief point is the inner principle of the will
namely that the consciousness of this duty be also the spring of action, in
order that we may be able to say of the man who joins to his knowledge this
principle of wisdom that he is a practical philosopher.
Now in this philosophy (of ethics) it
seems contrary to the idea of it that we should go back to metaphysical elements
in order to make the notion of duty purified from everything empirical (from
every feeling) a motive of action. For what sort of notion can we form of the
mighty power and herculean strength which would be sufficient to overcome the
vice-breeding inclinations, if Virtue is to borrow her "arms from the armoury of
metaphysics," which is a matter of speculation that only few men can handle?
Hence all ethical teaching in lecture rooms, pulpits, and popular books, when it
is decked out with fragments of metaphysics, becomes ridiculous. But it is not,
therefore, useless, much less ridiculous, to trace in metaphysics the first
principles of ethics; for it is only as a philosopher that anyone can reach the
first principles of this conception of duty, otherwise we could not look for
either certainty or purity in the ethical teaching. To rely for this reason on a
certain feeling which, on account of the effect expected from it, is called
moral, may, perhaps, even satisfy the popular teacher, provided he desires as
the criterion of a moral duty to consider the problem: "If everyone in every
case made your maxim the universal law, how could this law be consistent with
itself?" But if it were merely feeling that made it our duty to take this
principle as a criterion, then this would not be dictated by reason, but only
adopted instinctively and therefore blindly.
{PREFACE ^paragraph 5}
But in fact, whatever men imagine, no moral principle is based
on any feeling, but such a principle is really nothing else than an obscurely
conceived metaphysic which inheres in every man's reasoning faculty; as the
teacher will easily find who tries to catechize his pupils in the Socratic
method about the imperative of duty and its application to the moral judgement
of his actions. The mode of stating it need not be always metaphysical, and the
language need not necessarily be scholastic, unless the pupil is to be trained
to be a philosopher. But the thought must go back to the elements of
metaphysics, without which we cannot expect any certainty or purity, or even
motive power in ethics.
If we deviate from this principle and begin from pathological,
or purely sensitive, or even moral feeling (from what is subjectively practical
instead of what is objective), that is, from the matter of the will, the end,
not from its form that is the law, in order from thence to determine duties;
then, certainly, there are no metaphysical elements of ethics, for feeling by
whatever it may be excited is always physical. But then ethical teaching,
whether in schools, or lecture-rooms, etc., is corrupted in its source. For it
is not a matter of indifference by what motives or means one is led to a good
purpose (the obedience to duty). However disgusting, then, metaphysics may
appear to those pretended philosophers who dogmatize oracularly, or even
brilliantly, about the doctrine of duty, it is, nevertheless, an indispensable
duty for those who oppose it to go back to its principles even in ethics, and to
begin by going to school on its benches.
We may fairly wonder how, after all
previous explanations of the principles of duty, so far as it is derived from
pure reason, it was still possible to reduce it again to a doctrine of
happiness; in such a way, however, that a certain moral happiness not resting on
empirical causes was ultimately arrived at, a self-contradictory nonentity. In
fact, when the thinking man has conquered the temptations to vice, and is
conscious of having done his (often hard) duty, he finds himself in a state of
peace and satisfaction which may well be called happiness, in which virtue is
her own reward. Now, says the eudaemonist, this delight, this happiness, is the
real motive of his acting virtuously. The notion of duty, says be, does not
immediately determine his will; it is only by means of the happiness in prospect
that he is moved to his duty. Now, on the other hand, since he can promise
himself this reward of virtue only from the consciousness of having done his
duty, it is clear that the latter must have preceded: that is, be must feel
himself bound to do his duty before he thinks, and without thinking, that
happiness will be the consequence of obedience to duty. He is thus involved in a
circle in his assignment of cause and effect. He can only hope to be happy if he
is conscious of his obedience to duty: and he can only be moved to obedience to
duty if be foresees that he will thereby become happy. But in this reasoning
there is also a contradiction. For, on the one side, he must obey his duty,
without asking what effect this will have on his happiness, consequently, from a
moral principle; on the other side, he can only recognize something as his duty
when he can reckon on happiness which will accrue to him thereby, and
consequently on a pathological principle, which is the direct opposite of the
former.
I have in another place (the Berlin Monatsschrift), reduced, as
I believe, to the simplest expressions the distinction between pathological and
moral pleasure. The pleasure, namely, which must precede the obedience to the
law in order that one may act according to the law is pathological, and the
process follows the physical order of nature; that which must be preceded by the
law in order that it may be felt is in the moral order. If this distinction is
not observed; if eudaemonism (the principle of happiness) is adopted as the
principle instead of eleutheronomy (the principle of freedom of the inner
legislation), the consequence is the euthanasia (quiet death) of all morality.
{PREFACE ^paragraph 10}
The cause of these mistakes is no other than the following:
Those who are accustomed only to physiological explanations will not admit into
their heads the categorical imperative from which these laws dictatorially
proceed, notwithstanding that they feel themselves irresistibly forced by it.
Dissatisfied at not being able to explain what lies wholly beyond that sphere,
namely, freedom of the elective will, elevating as is this privilege, that man
has of being capable of such an idea. They are stirred up by the proud claims of
speculative reason, which feels its power so strongly in the fields, just as if
they were allies leagued in defence of the omnipotence of theoretical reason and
roused by a general call to arms to resist that idea; and thus they are at
present, and perhaps for a long time to come, though ultimately in vain, to
attack the moral concept of freedom and if possible render it doubtful.
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF ETHICS
Ethics in ancient times signified moral
philosophy (philosophia moral is) generally, which was also called the doctrine
of duties. Subsequently it was found advisable to confine this name to a part of
moral philosophy, namely, to the doctrine of duties which are not subject to
external laws (for which in German the name Tugendlehre was found suitable).
Thus the system of general deontology is divided into that of jurisprudence
(jurisprudentia), which is capable of external laws, and of ethics, which is not
thus capable, and we may let this division stand.
I. Exposition of the Conception of
Ethics
The notion of duty is in itself already
the notion of a constraint of the free elective will by the law; whether this
constraint be an external one or be self-constraint. The moral imperative, by
its categorical (the unconditional ought) announces this constraint, which
therefore does not apply to all rational beings (for there may also be holy
beings), but applies to men as rational physical beings who are unholy enough to
be seduced by pleasure to the transgression of the moral law, although they
themselves recognize its authority; and when they do obey it, to obey it
unwillingly (with resistance of their inclination); and it is in this that the
constraint properly consists. * Now, as man is a free (moral) being, the notion
of duty can contain only self-constraint (by the idea of the law itself), when
we look to the internal determination of the will (the spring), for thus only is
it possible to combine that constraint (even if it were external) with the
freedom of the elective will. The notion of duty then must be an ethical one.
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 5}
* Man, however, as at the same time a
moral being, when he considers himself objectively, which he is qualified to do
by his pure practical reason, (i.e., according to humanity in his own person).
finds himself holy enough to transgress the law only unwillingly; for there is
no man so depraved who in this transgression would not feel a resistance and an
abhorrence of himself, so that he must put a force on himself. It is impossible
to explain the phenomenon that at this parting of the ways (where the beautiful
fable places Hercules between virtue and sensuality) man shows more propensity
to obey inclination than the law. For, we can only explain what happens by
tracing it to a cause according to physical laws; but then we should not be able
to conceive the elective will as free. Now this mutually opposed self-constraint
and the inevitability of it makes us recognize the incomprehensible property of
freedom.
The impulses of nature, then, contain
hindrances to the fulfilment of duty in the mind of man, and resisting forces,
some of them powerful; and he must judge himself able to combat these and to
conquer them by means of reason, not in the future, but in the present,
simultaneously with the thought; he must judge that he can do what the law
unconditionally commands that be ought.
Now the power and resolved purpose to resist a strong but unjust
opponent is called fortitude (fortitudo), and when concerned with the opponent
of the moral character within us, it is virtue (virtus, fortitudo moralis).
Accordingly, general deontology, in that part which brings not external, but
internal, freedom under laws is the doctrine of virtue.
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 10}
Jurisprudence had to do only with the formal condition of
external freedom (the condition of consistency with itself, if its maxim became
a universal law), that is, with law. Ethics, on the contrary, supplies us with a
matter (an object of the free elective will), an end of pure reason which is at
the same time conceived as an objectively necessary end, i.e., as duty for all
men. For, as the sensible inclinations mislead us to ends (which are the matter
of the elective will) that may contradict duty, the legislating reason cannot
otherwise guard against their influence than by an opposite moral end, which
therefore must be given a priori independently on inclination.
An end is an object of the elective will (of a rational being)
by the idea of which this will is determined to an action for the production of
this object. Now I may be forced by others to actions which are directed to an
end as means, but I cannot be forced to have an end; I can only make something
an end to myself. If, however, I am also bound to make something which lies in
the notions of practical reason an end to myself, and therefore besides the
formal determining principle of the elective will (as contained in law) to have
also a material principle, an end which can be opposed to the end derived from
sensible impulses; then this gives the notion of an end which is in itself a
duty. The doctrine of this cannot belong to jurisprudence, but to ethics, since
this alone includes in its conception self-constraint according to moral laws.
For this reason, ethics may also be defined as the system of the
ends of the pure practical reason. The two parts of moral philosophy are
distinguished as treating respectively of ends and of duties of constraint. That
ethics contains duties to the observance of which one cannot be (physically)
forced by others, is merely the consequence of this, that it is a doctrine of
ends, since to be forced to have ends or to set them before one's self is a
contradiction.
Now that ethics is a doctrine of virtue (doctrina officiorum
virtutis) follows from the definition of virtue given above compared with the
obligation, the peculiarity of which has just been shown. There is in fact no
other determination of the elective will, except that to an end, which in the
very notion of it implies that I cannot even physically be forced to it by the
elective will of others. Another may indeed force me to do something which is
not my end (but only means to the end of another), but he cannot force me to
make it my own end, and yet I can have no end except of my own making. The
latter supposition would be a contradiction- an act of freedom which yet at the
same time would not be free. But there is no contradiction in setting before
one's self an end which is also a duty: for in this case I constrain myself, and
this is quite consistent with freedom. * But how is such an end possible? That
is now the question. For the possibility of the notion of the thing (viz., that
it is not self-contradictory) is not enough to prove the possibility of the
thing itself (the objective reality of the notion).
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 15}
* The less a man can be physically forced, and the more he can
be morally forced (by the mere idea of duty), so much the freer he is. The man,
for example, who is of sufficiently firm resolution and strong mind not to give
up an enjoyment which he has resolved on, however much loss is shown as
resulting therefrom, and who yet desists from his purpose unhesitatingly, though
very reluctantly, when he finds that it would cause him to neglect an official
duty or a sick father; this man proves his freedom in the highest degree by this
very thing, that he cannot resist the voice of duty.
II. Exposition of the Notion of an End
which is also a Duty
We can conceive the relation of end to
duty in two ways; either starting from the end to find the maxim of the dutiful
actions; or conversely, setting out from this to find the end which is also
duty. jurisprudence proceeds in the former way. It is left to everyone's free
elective will what end he will choose for his action. But its maxim is
determined a priori; namely, that the freedom of the agent must be consistent
with the freedom of every other according to a universal law.
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 20}
Ethics, however, proceeds in the opposite way. It cannot start
from the ends which the man may propose to himself, and hence give directions as
to the maxims he should adopt, that is, as to his duty; for that would be to
take empirical principles of maxims, and these could not give any notion of
duty; since this, the categorical ought, has its root in pure reason alone.
Indeed, if the maxims were to be adopted in accordance with those ends (which
are all selfish), we could not properly speak of the notion of duty at all.
Hence in ethics the notion of duty must lead to ends, and must on moral
principles give the foundation of maxims with respect to the ends which we ought
to propose to ourselves.
Setting aside the question what sort of end that is which is in
itself a duty, and how such an end is possible, it is here only necessary to
show that a duty of this kind is called a duty of virtue, and why it is so
called.
To every duty corresponds a right of action (facultas moral is
generatim), but all duties do not imply a corresponding right (facultas
juridica) of another to compel any one, but only the duties called legal duties.
Similarly to all ethical obligation corresponds the notion of virtue, but it
does not follow that all ethical duties are duties of virtue. Those, in fact,
are not so which do not concern so much a certain end (matter, object of the
elective will), but merely that which is formal in the moral determination of
the will (e.g., that the dutiful action must also be done from duty). It is only
an end which is also duty that can be called a duty of virtue. Hence there are
several of the latter kind (and thus there are distinct virtues); on the
contrary, there is only one duty of the former kind, but it is one which is
valid for all actions (only one virtuous disposition).
The duty of virtue is essentially distinguished from the duty of
justice in this respect; that it is morally possible to be externally compelled
to the latter, whereas the former rests on free self-constraint only. For finite
holy beings (which cannot even be tempted to the violation of duty) there is no
doctrine of virtue, but only moral philosophy, the latter being an autonomy of
practical reason, whereas the former is also an autocracy of it. That is, it
includes a consciousness- not indeed immediately perceived, but rightly
concluded, from the moral categorical imperative- of the power to become master
of one's inclinations which resist the law; so that human morality in its
highest stage can yet be nothing more than virtue; even if it were quite pure
(perfectly free from the influence of a spring foreign to duty), a state which
is poetically personified under the name of the wise man (as an ideal to which
one should continually approximate).
Virtue, however, is not to be defined and esteemed merely as
habit, and (as it is expressed in the prize essay of Cochius) as a long custom
acquired by practice of morally good actions. For, if this is not an effect of
well-resolved and firm principles ever more and more purified, then, like any
other mechanical arrangement brought about by technical practical reason, it is
neither armed for all circumstances nor adequately secured against the change
that may be wrought by new allurements.
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 25}
REMARK
To virtue = + a is opposed as its
logical contradictory (contradictorie oppositum) the negative lack of virtue
(moral weakness) = o; but vice = a is its contrary (contrarie s. realiter
oppositum); and it is not merely a needless question but an offensive one to ask
whether great crimes do not perhaps demand more strength of mind than great
virtues. For by strength of mind we understand the strength of purpose of a man,
as a being endowed with freedom, and consequently so far as he is master of
himself (in his senses) and therefore in a healthy condition of mind. But great
crimes are paroxysms, the very sight of which makes the man of healthy mind
shudder. The question would therefore be something like this: whether a man in a
fit of madness can have more physical strength than if he is in his senses; and
we may admit this without on that account ascribing to him more strength of
mind, if by mind we understand the vital principle of man in the free use of his
powers. For since those crimes have their ground merely in the power of the
inclinations that weaken reason, which does not prove strength of mind, this
question would be nearly the same as the question whether a man in a fit of
illness can show more strength than in a healthy condition; and this may be
directly denied, since the want of health, which consists in the proper balance
of all the bodily forces of the man, is a weakness in the system of these
forces, by which system alone we can estimate absolute health.
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 30}
III. Of the Reason for conceiving an End which is also a Duty
An end is an object of the free elective
will, the idea of which determines this will to an action by which the object is
produced. Accordingly every action has its end, and as no one can have an end
without himself making the object of his elective will his end, hence to have
some end of actions is an act of the freedom of the agent, not an affect of
physical nature. Now, since this act which determines an end is a practical
principle which commands not the means (therefore not conditionally) but the end
itself (therefore unconditionally), hence it is a categorical imperative of pure
practical reason and one, therefore, which combines a concept of duty with that
of an end in general.
Now there must be such an end and a categorical imperative
corresponding to it. For since there are free actions, there must also be ends
to which as an object those actions are directed. Amongst these ends there must
also be some which are at the same time (that is, by their very notion) duties.
For if there were none such, then since no actions can be without an end, all
ends which practical reason might have would be valid only as means to other
ends, and a categorical imperative would be impossible; a supposition which
destroys all moral philosophy.
Here, therefore, we treat not of ends which man actually makes
to himself in accordance with the sensible impulses of his nature, but of
objects of the free elective will under its own laws- objects which he ought to
make his end. We may call the former technical (subjective), properly
pragmatical, including the rules of prudence in the choice of its ends; but the
latter we must call the moral (objective) doctrine of ends. This distinction is,
however, superfluous here, since moral philosophy already by its very notion is
clearly separated from the doctrine of physical nature (in the present instance,
anthropology). The latter resting on empirical principles, whereas the moral
doctrine of ends which treats of duties rests on principles given a priori in
pure practical reason.
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 35}
IV. What are the Ends which are also
Duties?
They are: A. OUR OWN PERFECTION, B.
HAPPINESS OF OTHERS.
We cannot invert these and make on one side our own happiness,
and on the other the perfection of others, ends which should be in themselves
duties for the same person.
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 40}
For one's own happiness is, no doubt, an end that all men have
(by virtue of the impulse of their nature), but this end cannot without
contradiction be regarded as a duty. What a man of himself inevitably wills does
not come under the notion of duty, for this is a constraint to an end
reluctantly adopted. It is, therefore, a contradiction to say that a man is in
duty bound to advance his own happiness with all his power.
It is likewise a contradiction to make the perfection of another
my end, and to regard myself as in duty bound to promote it. For it is just in
this that the perfection of another man as a person consists, namely, that he is
able of himself to set before him his own end according to his own notions of
duty; and it is a contradiction to require (to make it a duty for me) that I
should do something which no other but himself can do.
V. Explanation of these two Notions
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 45}
A. OUR OWN PERFECTION
The word perfection is liable to many
misconceptions. It is sometimes understood as a notion belonging to
transcendental philosophy; viz., the notion of the totality of the manifold
which taken together constitutes a thing; sometimes, again, it is understood as
belonging to teleology, so that it signifies the correspondence of the
properties of a thing to an end. Perfection in the former sense might be called
quantitative (material), in the latter qualitative (formal) perfection. The
former can be one only, for the whole of what belongs to the one thing is one.
But of the latter there may be several in one thing; and it is of the latter
property that we here treat.
When it is said of the perfection that belongs to man generally
(properly speaking, to humanity), that it is in itself a duty to make this our
end, it must be placed in that which may be the effect of one's deed, not in
that which is merely an endowment for which we have to thank nature; for
otherwise it would not be duty. Consequently, it can be nothing else than the
cultivation of one's power (or natural capacity) and also of one's will (moral
disposition) to satisfy the requirement of duty in general. The supreme element
in the former (the power) is the understanding, it being the faculty of
concepts, and, therefore, also of those concepts which refer to duty. First it
is his duty to labour to raise himself out of the rudeness of his nature, out of
his animal nature more and more to humanity, by which alone he is capable of
setting before him ends to supply the defects of his ignorance by instruction,
and to correct his errors; he is not merely counselled to do this by reason as
technically practical, with a view to his purposes of other kinds (as art), but
reason, as morally practical, absolutely commands him to do it, and makes this
end his duty, in order that he may be worthy of the humanity that dwells in him.
Secondly, to carry the cultivation of his will up to the purest virtuous
disposition, that, namely, in which the law is also the spring of his dutiful
actions, and to obey it from duty, for this is internal morally practical
perfection. This is called the moral sense (as it were a special sense, sensus
moralis), because it is a feeling of the effect which the legislative will
within himself exercises on the faculty of acting accordingly. This is, indeed,
often misused fanatically, as though (like the genius of Socrates) it preceded
reason, or even could dispense with judgement of reason; but still it is a moral
perfection, making every special end, which is also a duty, one's own end.
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 50}
B. HAPPINESS OF OTHERS
It is inevitable for human nature that a
should wish and seek for happiness, that is, satisfaction with his condition,
with certainty of the continuance of this satisfaction. But for this very reason
it is not an end that is also a duty. Some writers still make a distinction
between moral and physical happiness (the former consisting in satisfaction with
one's person and moral behaviour, that is, with what one does; the other in
satisfaction with that which nature confers, consequently with what one enjoys
as a foreign gift). Without at present censuring the misuse of the word (which
even involves a contradiction), it must be observed that the feeling of the
former belongs solely to the preceding head, namely, perfection. For he who is
to feel himself happy in the mere consciousness of his uprightness already
possesses that perfection which in the previous section was defined as that end
which is also duty.
If happiness, then, is in question, which it is to be my duty to
promote as my end, it must be the happiness of other men whose (permitted) end I
hereby make also mine. It still remains left to themselves to decide what they
shall reckon as belonging to their happiness; only that it is in my power to
decline many things which they so reckon, but which I do not so regard,
supposing that they have no right to demand it from me as their own. A plausible
objection often advanced against the division of duties above adopted consists
in setting over against that end a supposed obligation to study my own
(physical) happiness, and thus making this, which is my natural and merely
subjective end, my duty (and objective end). This requires to be cleared up.
Adversity, pain, and want are great temptations to transgression
of one's duty; accordingly it would seem that strength, health, a competence,
and welfare generally, which are opposed to that influence, may also be regarded
as ends that are also duties; that is, that it is a duty to promote our own
happiness not merely to make that of others our end. But in that case the end is
not happiness but the morality of the agent; and happiness is only the means of
removing the hindrances to morality; permitted means, since no one has a right
to demand from me the sacrifice of my not immoral ends. It is not directly a
duty to seek a competence for one's self; but indirectly it may be so; namely,
in order to guard against poverty which is a great temptation to vice. But then
it is not my happiness but my morality, to maintain which in its integrity is at
once my end and my duty.
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 55}
VI. Ethics does not supply Laws for
Actions (which is done by
Jurisprudence), but only for the Maxims of Action
The notion of duty stands in immediate
relation to a law (even though I abstract from every end which is the matter of
the law); as is shown by the formal principle of duty in the categorical
imperative: "Act so that the maxims of thy action might become a universal law."
But in ethics this is conceived as the law of thy own will, not of will in
general, which might be that of others; for in the latter case it would give
rise to a judicial duty which does not belong to the domain of ethics. In
ethics, maxims are regarded as those subjective laws which merely have the
specific character of universal legislation, which is only a negative principle
(not to contradict a law in general). How, then, can there be further a law for
the maxims of actions?
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 60}
It is the notion of an end which is also a duty, a notion
peculiar to ethics, that alone is the foundation of a law for the maxims of
actions; by making the subjective end (that which every one has) subordinate to
the objective end (that which every one ought to make his own). The imperative:
"Thou shalt make this or that thy end (e. g., the happiness of others)" applies
to the matter of the elective will (an object). Now since no free action is
possible, without the agent having in view in it some end (as matter of his
elective will), it follows that, if there is an end which is also a duty, the
maxims of actions which are means to ends must contain only the condition of
fitness for a possible universal legislation: on the other hand, the end which
is also a duty can make it a law that we should have such a maxim, whilst for
the maxim itself the possibility of agreeing with a universal legislation is
sufficient.
For maxims of actions may be arbitrary, and are only limited by
the condition of fitness for a universal legislation, which is the formal
principle of actions. But a law abolishes the arbitrary character of actions,
and is by this distinguished from recommendation (in which one only desires to
know the best means to an end).
VII. Ethical Duties are of
indeterminate, Juridical Duties of
strict, Obligation
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 65}
This proposition is a consequence of the
foregoing; for if the law can only command the maxim of the actions, not the
actions themselves, this is a sign that it leaves in the observance of it a
latitude (latitudo) for the elective will; that is, it cannot definitely assign
how and how much we should do by the action towards the end which is also duty.
But by an indeterminate duty is not meant a permission to make exceptions from
the maxim of the actions, but only the permission to limit one maxim of duty by
another (e. g., the general love of our neighbour by the love of parents); and
this in fact enlarges the field for the practice of virtue. The more
indeterminate the duty, and the more imperfect accordingly the obligation of the
man to the action, and the closer he nevertheless brings this maxim of obedience
thereto (in his own mind) to the strict duty (of justice), so much the more
perfect is his virtuous action.
Hence it is only imperfect duties that are duties of virtue. The
fulfilment of them is merit (meritum) = + a; but their transgression is not
necessarily demerit (demeritum) = - a, but only moral unworth = o, unless the
agent made it a principle not to conform to those duties. The strength of
purpose in the former case is alone properly called virtue [Tugend] (virtus);
the weakness in the latter case is not vice (vitium), but rather only lack of
virtue [Untugend], a want of moral strength (defectus moralis). (As the word
Tugend is derived from taugen [to be good for something], Untugend by its
etymology signifies good for nothing.) Every action contrary to duty is called
transgression (peccatum). Deliberate transgression which has become a principle
is what properly constitutes what is called vice (vitium).
Although the conformity of actions to justice (i.e., to be an
upright man) is nothing meritorious, yet the conformity of the maxim of such
actions regarded as duties, that is, reverence for justice is meritorious. For
by this the man makes the right of humanity or of men his own end, and thereby
enlarges his notion of duty beyond that of indebtedness (officium debiti), since
although another man by virtue of his rights can demand that my actions shall
conform to the law, he cannot demand that the law shall also contain the spring
of these actions. The same thing is true of the general ethical command, "Act
dutifully from a sense of duty." To fix this disposition firmly in one's mind
and to quicken it is, as in the former case, meritorious, because it goes beyond
the law of duty in actions and makes the law in itself the spring.
But just for or reason, those duties also must be reckoned as of
indeterminate obligation, in respect of which there exists a subjective
principle which ethically rewards them; or to bring them as near as possible to
the notion of a strict obligation, a principle of susceptibility of this reward
according to the law of virtue; namely, a moral pleasure which goes beyond mere
satisfaction with oneself (which may be merely negative), and of which it is
proudly said that in this consciousness virtue is its own reward.
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 70}
When this merit is a merit of the man in respect of other men of
promoting their natural ends, which are recognized as such by all men (making
their happiness his own), we might call it the sweet merit, the consciousness of
which creates a moral enjoyment in which men are by sympathy inclined to revel;
whereas the bitter merit of promoting the true welfare of other men, even though
they should not recognize it as such (in the case of the unthankful and
ungrateful), has commonly no such reaction, but only produces a satisfaction
with one's self, although in the latter case this would be even greater.
VIII. Exposition of the Duties of Virtue
as Intermediate Duties
(1) OUR OWN PERFECTION as an end which
is also a duty
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 75}
(a) Physical perfection; that is, cultivation of all our
faculties generally for the promotion of the ends set before us by reason. That
this is a duty, and therefore an end in itself, and that the effort to effect
this even without regard to the advantage that it secures us, is based, not on a
conditional (pragmatic), but an unconditional (moral) imperative, may be seen
from the following consideration. The power of proposing to ourselves an end is
the characteristic of humanity (as distinguished from the brutes). With the end
of humanity in our own person is therefore combined the rational will, and
consequently the duty of deserving well of humanity by culture generally, by
acquiring or advancing the power to carry out all sorts of possible ends, so far
as this power is to be found in man; that is, it is a duty to cultivate the
crude capacities of our nature, since it is by that cultivation that the animal
is raised to man, therefore it is a duty in itself.
This duty, however, is merely ethical, that is, of indeterminate
obligation. No principle of reason prescribes how far one must go in this effort
(in enlarging or correcting his faculty of understanding, that is, in
acquisition of knowledge or technical capacity); and besides the difference in
the circumstances into which men may come makes the choice of the kind of
employment for which he should cultivate his talent very arbitrary. Here,
therefore, there is no law of reason for actions, but only for the maxim of
actions, viz.: "Cultivate thy faculties of mind and body so as to be effective
for all ends that may come in thy way, uncertain which of them may become thy
own."
(b) Cultivation of Morality in ourselves. The greatest moral
perfection of man is to do his duty, and that from duty (that the law be not
only the rule but also the spring of his actions). Now at first sight this seems
to be a strict obligation, and as if the principle of duty commanded not merely
the legality of every action, but also the morality, i.e., the mental
disposition, with the exactness and strictness of a law; but in fact the law
commands even here only the maxim of the action, namely, that we should seek the
ground of obligation, not in the sensible impulses (advantage or disadvantage),
but wholly in the law; so that the action itself is not commanded. For it is not
possible to man to see so far into the depth of his own heart that he could ever
be thoroughly certain of the purity of his moral purpose and the sincerity of
his mind even in one single action, although he has no doubt about the legality
of it. Nay, often the weakness which deters a man from the risk of a crime is
regarded by him as virtue (which gives the notion of strength). And how many
there are who may have led a long blameless life, who are only fortunate in
having escaped so many temptations. How much of the element of pure morality in
their mental disposition may have belonged to each deed remains hidden even from
themselves.
Accordingly, this duty to estimate the worth of one's actions
not merely by their legality, but also by their morality (mental disposition),
is only of indeterminate obligation; the law does not command this internal
action in the human mind itself, but only the maxim of the action, namely, that
we should strive with all our power that for all dutiful actions the thought of
duty should be of itself an adequate spring.
(2) HAPPINESS OF OTHERS as an end which is also a duty
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 80}
(a) Physical Welfare. Benevolent wishes may be unlimited, for
they do not imply doing anything. But the case is more difficult with benevolent
action, especially when this is to be done, not from friendly inclination (love)
to others, but from duty, at the expense of the sacrifice and mortification of
many of our appetites. That this beneficence is a duty results from this: that
since our self-love cannot be separated from the need to be loved by others (to
obtain help from them in case of necessity), we therefore make ourselves an end
for others; and this maxim can never be obligatory except by having the specific
character of a universal law, and consequently by means of a will that we should
also make others our ends. Hence the happiness of others is an end that is also
a duty.
I am only bound then to sacrifice to others a part of my welfare
without hope of recompense: because it is my duty, and it is impossible to
assign definite limits how far that may go. Much depends on what would be the
true want of each according to his own feelings, and it must be left to each to
determine this for himself. For that one should sacrifice his own happiness, his
true wants, in order to promote that of others, would be a self-contradictory
maxim if made a universal law. This duty, therefore, is only indeterminate; it
has a certain latitude within which one may do more or less without our being
able to assign its limits definitely. The law holds only for the maxims, not for
definite actions.
(b) Moral well-being of others (salus moral is) also belongs to
the happiness of others, which it is our duty to promote, but only a negative
duty. The pain that a man feels from remorse of conscience, although its origin
is moral, is yet in its operation physical, like grief, fear, and every other
diseased condition. To take care that he should not be deservedly smitten by
this inward reproach is not indeed my duty but his business; nevertheless, it is
my duty to do nothing which by the nature of man might seduce him to that for
which his conscience may hereafter torment him, that is, it is my duty not to
give him occasion of stumbling. But there are no definite limits within which
this care for the moral satisfaction of others must be kept; therefore it
involves only an indeterminate obligation.
IX. What is a Duty of Virtue?
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 85}
Virtue is the strength of the man's
maxim in his obedience to duty. All strength is known only by the obstacles that
it can overcome; and in the case of virtue the obstacles are the natural
inclinations which may come into conflict with the moral purpose; and as it is
the man who himself puts these obstacles in the way of his maxims, hence virtue
is not merely a self-constraint (for that might be an effort of one inclination
to constrain another), but is also a constraint according to a principle of
inward freedom, and therefore by the mere idea of duty, according to its formal
law.
All duties involve a notion of necessitation by the law, and
ethical duties involve a necessitation for which only an internal legislation is
possible; juridical duties, on the other hand, one for which external
legislation also is possible. Both, therefore, include the notion of constraint,
either self-constraint or constraint by others. The moral power of the former is
virtue, and the action springing from such a disposition (from reverence for the
law) may be called a virtuous action (ethical), although the law expresses a
juridical duty. For it is the doctrine of virtue that commands us to regard the
rights of men as holy.
But it does not follow that everything the doing of which is
virtue, is, properly speaking, a duty of virtue. The former may concern merely
the form of the maxims; the latter applies to the matter of them, namely, to an
end which is also conceived as duty. Now, as the ethical obligation to ends, of
which there may be many, is only indeterminate, because it contains only a law
for the maxim of actions, and the end is the matter (object) of elective will;
hence there are many duties, differing according to the difference of lawful
ends, which may be called duties of virtue (officia honestatis), just because
they are subject only to free self-constraint, not to the constraint of other
men, and determine the end which is also a duty.
Virtue, being a coincidence of the rational will, with every
duty firmly settled in the character, is, like everything formal, only one and
the same. But, as regards the end of actions, which is also duty, that is, as
regards the matter which one ought to make an end, there may be several virtues;
and as the obligation to its maxim is called a duty of virtue, it follows that
there are also several duties of virtue.
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 90}
The supreme principle of ethics (the doctrine of virtue) is:
"Act on a maxim, the ends of which are such as it might be a universal law for
everyone to have." On this principle a man is an end to himself as well as
others, and it is not enough that he is not permitted to use either himself or
others merely as means (which would imply that be might be indifferent to them),
but it is in itself a duty of every man to make mankind in general his end.
The principle of ethics being a categorical imperative does not
admit of proof, but it admits of a justification from principles of pure
practical reason. Whatever in relation to mankind, to oneself, and others, can
be an end, that is an end for pure practical reason: for this is a faculty of
assigning ends in general; and to be indifferent to them, that is, to take no
interest in them, is a contradiction; since in that case it would not determine
the maxims of actions (which always involve an end), and consequently would
cease to be practical reasons. Pure reason, however, cannot command any ends a
priori, except so far as it declares the same to be also a duty, which duty is
then cared a duty of virtue.
X. The Supreme Principle of
Jurisprudence was Analytical; that of
Ethics is Synthetical
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 95}
That external constraint, so far as it
withstands that which hinders the external freedom that agrees with general laws
(as an obstacle of the obstacle thereto), can be consistent with ends generally,
is clear on the principle of contradiction, and I need not go beyond the notion
of freedom in order to see it, let the end which each may be what he will.
Accordingly, the supreme principle of jurisprudence is an analytical principle.
On the contrary the principle of ethics goes beyond the notion of external
freedom and, by general laws, connects further with it an end which it makes a
duty. This principle, therefore, is synthetic. The possibility of it is
contained in the deduction (SS ix).
This enlargement of the notion of duty beyond that of external
freedom and of its limitation by the merely formal condition of its constant
harmony; this, I say, in which, instead of constraint from without, there is set
up freedom within, the power of self-constraint, and that not by the help of
other inclinations, but by pure practical reason (which scorns all such help),
consists in this fact, which raises it above juridical duty; that by it ends are
proposed from which jurisprudence altogether abstracts. In the case of the moral
imperative, and the supposition of freedom which it necessarily involves, the
law, the power (to fulfil it) and the rational will that determines the maxim,
constitute all the elements that form the notion of juridical duty. But in the
imperative, which commands the duty of virtue, there is added, besides the
notion of self-constraint, that of an end; not one that we have, but that we
ought to have, which, therefore, pure practical reason has in itself, whose
highest, unconditional end (which, however, continues to be duty) consists in
this: that virtue is its own end and, by deserving well of men, is also its own
reward. Herein it shines so brightly as an ideal to human perceptions, it seems
to cast in the shade even holiness itself, which is never tempted to
transgression. * This, however, is an illusion arising from the fact that as we
have no measure for the degree of strength, except the greatness of the
obstacles which might have been overcome (which in our case are the
inclinations), we are led to mistake the subjective conditions of estimation of
a magnitude for the objective conditions of the magnitude itself. But when
compared with human ends, all of which have their obstacles to be overcome, it
is true that the worth of virtue itself, which is its own end, far outweighs the
worth of all the utility and all the empirical ends and advantages which it may
have as consequences.
* So that one might very two well-known
lines of Haller thus:
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 100}
With all his failings, man is still
Better than angels void of will.
We may, indeed, say that man is obliged
to virtue (as a moral strength). For although the power (facultas) to overcome
all imposing sensible impulses by virtue of his freedom can and must be
presupposed, yet this power regarded as strength (robur) is something that must
be acquired by the moral spring (the idea of the law) being elevated by
contemplation of the dignity of the pure law of reason in us, and at the same
time also by exercise.
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 105}
XI. According to the preceding Principles, the Scheme of Duties
of
Virtue may be thus exhibited
The Material Element of the Duty of
Virtue
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 110}
1 2
Internal Duty of Virtue External Virtue of Duty
My Own End, The End of Others,
which is also my the promotion of
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 115}
Duty which is also my
Duty
(My own (The Happiness
Perfection) of Others)
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 120}
3 4
The Law which is The End which is
also Spring also Spring
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 125}
On which the On which the
Morality Legality
of every free determination of will
rests
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 130}
The Formal Element of the Duty of Virtue.
XII. Preliminary Notions of the
Susceptibility of the Mind for
Notions of Duty generally
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 135}
These are such moral qualities as, when a man does not possess
them, he is not bound to acquire them. They are: the moral feeling, conscience,
love of one's neighbour, and respect for ourselves (self-esteem). There is no
obligation to have these, since they are subjective conditions of susceptibility
for the notion of duty, not objective conditions of morality. They are all
sensitive and antecedent, but natural capacities of mind (praedispositio) to be
affected by notions of duty; capacities which it cannot be regarded as a duty to
have, but which every man has, and by virtue of which he can be brought under
obligation. The consciousness of them is not of empirical origin, but can only
follow on that of a moral law, as an effect of the same on the mind.
A. THE MORAL FEELING
This is the susceptibility for pleasure
or displeasure, merely from the consciousness of the agreement or disagreement
of our action with the law of duty. Now, every determination of the elective
will proceeds from the idea of the possible action through the feeling of
pleasure or displeasure in taking an interest in it or its effect to the deed;
and here the sensitive state (the affection of the internal sense) is either a
pathological or a moral feeling. The former is the feeling that precedes the
idea of the law, the latter that which may follow it.
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 140}
Now it cannot be a duty to have a moral feeling, or to acquire
it; for all consciousness of obligation supposes this feeling in order that one
may become conscious of the necessitation that lies in the notion of duty; but
every man (as a moral being) has it originally in himself; the obligation, then,
can only extend to the cultivation of it and the strengthening of it even by
admiration of its inscrutable origin; and this is effected by showing how it is
just, by the mere conception of reason, that it is excited most strongly, in its
own purity and apart from every pathological stimulus; and it is improper to
call this feeling a moral sense; for the word sense generally means a
theoretical power of perception directed to an object; whereas the moral feeling
(like pleasure and displeasure in general) is something merely subjective, which
supplies no knowledge. No man is wholly destitute of moral feeling, for if he
were totally unsusceptible of this sensation he would be morally dead; and, to
speak in the language of physicians, if the moral vital force could no longer
produce any effect on this feeling, then his humanity would be dissolved (as it
were by chemical laws) into mere animality and be irrevocably confounded with
the mass of other physical beings. But we have no special sense for (moral) good
and evil any more than for truth, although such expressions are often used; but
we have a susceptibility of the free elective will for being moved by pure
practical reason and its law; and it is this that we call the moral feeling.
B. OF CONSCIENCE
Similarly, conscience is not a thing to
be acquired, and it is not a duty to acquire it; but every man, as a moral
being, has it originally within him. To be bound to have a conscience would be
as much as to say to be under a duty to recognize duties. For conscience is
practical reason which, in every case of law, holds before a man his duty for
acquittal or condemnation; consequently it does not refer to an object, but only
to the subject (affecting the moral feeling by its own act); so that it is an
inevitable fact, not an obligation and duty. When, therefore, it is said, "This
man has no conscience," what is meant is that he pays no heed to its dictates.
For if he really had none, he would not take credit to himself for anything done
according to duty, nor reproach himself with violation of duty, and therefore he
would be unable even to conceive the duty of having a conscience.
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 145}
I pass by the manifold subdivisions of conscience, and only
observe what follows from what has just been said, namely, that there is no such
thing as an erring conscience. No doubt it is possible sometimes to err in the
objective judgement whether something is a duty or not; but I cannot err in the
subjective whether I have compared it with my practical (here judicially acting)
reason for the purpose of that judgement: for if I erred I would not have
exercised practical judgement at all, and in that case there is neither truth
nor error. Unconscientiousness is not want of conscience, but the propensity not
to heed its judgement. But when a man is conscious of having acted according to
his conscience, then, as far as regards guilt or innocence, nothing more can be
required of him, only he is bound to enlighten his understanding as to what is
duty or not; but when it comes or has come to action, then conscience speaks
involuntarily and inevitably. To act conscientiously can, therefore, not be a
duty, since otherwise it would be necessary to have a second conscience, in
order to be conscious of the act of the first.
The duty here is only to cultivate our con. science, to quicken
our attention to the voice of the internal judge, and to use all means to secure
obedience to it, and is thus our indirect duty.
C. OF LOVE TO MEN
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 150}
Love is a matter of feeling, not of will or volition, and I
cannot love because I will to do so, still less because I ought (I cannot be
necessitated to love); hence there is no such thing as a duty to love.
Benevolence, however (amor benevolentiae), as a mode of action, may be subject
to a law of duty. Disinterested benevolence is often called (though very
improperly) love; even where the happiness of the other is not concerned, but
the complete and free surrender of all one's own ends to the ends of another
(even a superhuman) being, love is spoken of as being also our duty. But all
duty is necessitation or constraint, although it may be self-constraint
according to a law. But what is done from constraint is not done from love.
It is a duty to do good to other men according to our power,
whether we love them or not, and this duty loses nothing of its weight, although
we must make the sad remark that our species, alas! is not such as to be found
particularly worthy of love when we know it more closely. Hatred of men,
however, is always hateful: even though without any active hostility it consists
only in complete aversion from mankind (the solitary misanthropy). For
benevolence still remains a duty even towards the manhater, whom one cannot
love, but to whom we can show kindness.
To hate vice in men is neither duty nor against duty, but a mere
feeling of horror of vice, the will having no influence on the feeling nor the
feeling on the will. Beneficence is a duty. He who often practises this, and
sees his beneficent purpose succeed, comes at last really to love him whom he
has benefited. When, therefore, it is said: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as
thyself," this does not mean, "Thou shalt first of all love, and by means of
this love (in the next place) do him good"; but: "Do good to thy neighbour, and
this beneficence will produce in thee the love of men (as a settled habit of
inclination to beneficence)."
The love of complacency (amor complacentiae,) would therefore
alone be direct. This is a pleasure immediately connected with the idea of the
existence of an object, and to have a duty to this, that is, to be necessitated
to find pleasure in a thing, is a contradiction.
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 155}
D. OF RESPECT
Respect (reverentia) is likewise
something merely subjective; a feeling of a peculiar kind not a judgement about
an object which it would be a duty to effect or to advance. For if considered as
duty it could only be conceived as such by means of the respect which we have
for it. To have a duty to this, therefore, would be as much as to say to be
bound in duty to have a duty. When, therefore, it is said: "Man has a duty of
self-esteem," this is improperly stated, and we ought rather to say: "The law
within him inevitably forces from him respect for his own being, and this
feeling (which is of a peculiar kind) is a basis of certain duties, that is, of
certain actions which may be consistent with his duty to himself." But we cannot
say that he has a duty of respect for himself; for he must have respect for the
law within himself, in order to be able to conceive duty at all.
XIII. General Principles of the
Metaphysics of Morals in the
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 160}
treatment of Pure Ethics
First. A duty can have only a single
ground of obligation; and if two or more proof of it are adduced, this is a
certain mark that either no valid proof has yet been given, or that there are
several distinct duties which have been regarded as one.
For all moral proofs, being philosophical, can only be drawn by
means of rational knowledge from concepts, not like mathematics, through the
construction of concepts. The latter science admits a variety of proofs of one
and the same theorem; because in intuition a priori there may be several
properties of an object, all of which lead back to the very same principle. If,
for instance, to prove the duty of veracity, an argument is drawn first from the
harm that a lie causes to other men; another from the worthlessness of a liar
and the violation of his own self-respect, what is proved in the former argument
is a duty of benevolence, not of veracity, that is to say, not the duty which
required to be proved, but a different one. Now, if, in giving a variety of
proof for one and the same theorem, we flatter ourselves that the multitude of
reasons will compensate the lack of weight in each taken separately, this is a
very unphilosophical resource, since it betrays trickery and dishonesty; for
several insufficient proofs placed beside one another do not produce certainty,
nor even probability. They should advance as reason and consequence in a series,
up to the sufficient reason, and it is only in this way that they can have the
force of proof. Yet the former is the usual device of the rhetorician.
Secondly. The difference between virtue and vice cannot be
sought in the degree in which certain maxims are followed, but only in the
specific quality of the maxims (their relation to the law). In other words, the
vaunted principle of Aristotle, that virtue is the mean between two vices, is
false. * For instance, suppose that good management is given as the mean between
two vices, prodigality and avarice; then its origin as a virtue can neither be
defined as the gradual diminution of the former vice (by saving), nor as the
increase of the expenses of the miserly. These vices, in fact, cannot be viewed
as if they, proceeding as it were in opposite directions, met together in good
management; but each of them has its own maxim, which necessarily contradicts
that of the other.
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 165}
* The common classical formulae of
ethics- medio tutissimus ibis; omne mimium vertitur in vitium; est modus in
rebus, etc., medium tenuere beati; virtus est medium vitiorum et utrinque
reductum- ["You will go most safely in the middle" (Virgil); "Every excess
develops into a vice"; "There is a mean in all things, etc." (Horace); "Happy
they who steadily pursue a middle course"; "Virtue is the mean between two vices
and equally removed from either" (Horace).]- contain a poor sort of wisdom,
which has no definite principles; for this mean between two extremes, who will
assign it for me? Avarice (as a vice) is not distinguished from frugality (as a
virtue) by merely being the lat pushed too far; but has a quite different
principle; (maxim), namely placing the end of economy not in the enjoyment of
one's means, but in the mere possession of them, renouncing enjoyment; just as
the vice of prodigality is not to be sought in the excessive enjoyment of one's
means, but in the bad maxim which makes the use of them, without regard to their
maintenance, the sole end.
For the same reason, no vice can be
defined as an excess in the practice of certain actions beyond what is proper
(e.g., Prodigalitas est excessus in consumendis opibus); or, as a less exercise
of them than is fitting (Avaritia est defectus, etc.). For since in this way the
degree is left quite undefined, and the question whether conduct accords with
duty or not, turns wholly on this, such an account is of no use as a definition.
Thirdly. Ethical virtue must not be estimated by the power we
attribute to man of fulfilling the law; but, conversely, the moral power must be
estimated by the law, which commands categorically; not, therefore, by the
empirical knowledge that we have of men as they are, but by the rational
knowledge how, according to the ideas of humanity, they ought to be. These three
maxims of the scientific treatment of ethics are opposed to the older
apophthegms:
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 170}
1. There is only one virtue and only one vice.
2. Virtue is the observance of the mean path between two
opposite vices.
3. Virtue (like prudence) must be learned from experience.
XIV. Of Virtue in General
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 175}
Virtue signifies a moral strength of
will. But this does not exhaust the notion; for such strength might also belong
to a holy (superhuman) being, in whom no opposing impulse counteracts the law of
his rational will; who therefore willingly does everything in accordance with
the law. Virtue then is the moral strength of a man's will in his obedience to
duty; and this is a moral necessitation by his own law giving reason, inasmuch
as this constitutes itself a power executing the law. It is not itself a duty,
nor is it a duty to possess it (otherwise we should be in duty bound to have a
duty), but it commands, and accompanies its command with a moral constraint (one
possible by laws of internal freedom). But since this should be irresistible,
strength is requisite, and the degree of this strength can be estimated only by
the magnitude of the hindrances which man creates for himself, by his
inclinations. Vices, the brood of unlawful dispositions, are the monsters that
he has to combat; wherefore this moral strength as fortitude (fortitudo moral
is) constitutes the greatest and only true martial glory of man; it is also
called the true wisdom, namely, the practical, because it makes the ultimate end
of the existence of man on earth its own end. Its possession alone makes man
free, healthy, rich, a king, etc., nor either chance or fate deprive him of
this, since he possesses himself, and the virtuous cannot lose his virtue.
All the encomiums bestowed on the ideal of humanity in its moral
perfection can lose nothing of their practical reality by the examples of what
men now are, have been, or will probably be hereafter; anthropology which
proceeds from mere empirical knowledge cannot impair anthroponomy which is
erected by the unconditionally legislating reason; and although virtue may now
and then be called meritorious (in relation to men, not to the law), and be
worthy of reward, yet in itself, as it is its own end, so also it must be
regarded as its own reward.
Virtue considered in its complete perfection is, therefore,
regarded not as if man possessed virtue, but as if virtue possessed the man,
since in the former case it would appear as though he had still had the choice
(for which he would then require another virtue, in order to select virtue from
all other wares offered to him). To conceive a plurality of virtues (as we
unavoidably must) is nothing else but to conceive various moral objects to which
the (rational) will is led by the single principle of virtue; and it is the same
with the opposite vices. The expression which personifies both is a contrivance
for affecting the sensibility, pointing, however, to a moral sense. Hence it
follows that an aesthetic of morals is not a part, but a subjective exposition
of the Metaphysic of Morals; in which the emotions that accompany the force of
the moral law make the that force to be felt; for example: disgust, horror,
etc., which gives a sensible moral aversion in order to gain the precedence from
the merely sensible incitement.
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 180}
XV. Of the Principle on which Ethics is separated from
Jurisprudence
This separation on which the subdivision
of moral philosophy in general rests, is founded on this: that the notion of
freedom, which is common to both, makes it necessary to divide duties into those
of external and those of internal freedom; the latter of which alone are
ethical. Hence this internal freedom which is the condition of all ethical duty
must be discussed as a preliminary (discursus praeliminaris), just as above the
doctrine of conscience was discussed as the condition of all duty.
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 185}
REMARKS
Of the Doctrine of Virtue on the
Principle Of Internal Freedom.
Habit (habitus) is a facility of action
and a subjective perfection of the elective will. But not every such facility is
a free habit (habitus libertatis); for if it is custom (assuetudo), that is, a
uniformity of action which, by frequent repetition, has become a necessity, then
it is not a habit proceeding from freedom, and therefore not a moral habit.
Virtue therefore cannot be defined as a habit of free law-abiding actions,
unless indeed we add "determining itself in its action by the idea of the law";
and then this habit is not a property of the elective will, but of the rational
will, which is a faculty that in adopting a rule also declares it to be a
universal law, and it is only such a habit that can be reckoned as virtue. Two
things are required for internal freedom: to be master of oneself in a given
case (animus sui compos) and to have command over oneself (imperium in
semetipsum), that is to subdue his emotions and to govern his passions. With
these conditions, the character (indoles) is noble (erecta); in the opposite
case, it is ignoble (indoles abjecta serva).
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 190}
XVI. Virtue requires, first of all,
Command over Oneself
Emotions and passions are essentially
distinct; the former belong to feeling in so far as this coming before
reflection makes it more difficult or even impossible. Hence emotion is called
hasty (animus praeceps). And reason declares through the notion of virtue that a
man should collect himself; but this weakness in the life of one's
understanding, joined with the strength of a mental excitement, is only a lack
of virtue (Untugend), and as it were a weak and childish thing, which may very
well consist with the best will, and has further this one good thing in it, that
this storm soon subsides. A propensity to emotion (e.g., resentment) is
therefore not so closely related to vice as passion is. Passion, on the other
hand, is the sensible appetite grown into a permanent inclination (e. g., hatred
in contrast to resentment). The calmness with which one indulges it leaves room
for reflection and allows the mind to frame principles thereon for itself; and
thus when the inclination falls upon what contradicts the law, to brood on it,
to allow it to root itself deeply, and thereby to take up evil (as of set
purpose) into one's maxim; and this is then specifically evil, that is, it is a
true vice.
Virtue, therefore, in so far as it is based on internal freedom,
contains a positive command for man, namely, that he should bring all his powers
and inclinations under his rule (that of reason); and this is a positive precept
of command over himself which is additional to the prohibition, namely, that he
should not allow himself to be governed by his feelings and inclinations (the
duty of apathy); since, unless reason takes the reins of government into its own
hands, the feelings and inclinations play the master over the man.
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 195}
XVII. Virtue necessarily presupposes
Apathy (considered as
Strength)
This word (apathy) has come into bad
repute, just as if it meant want of feeling, and therefore subjective
indifference with respect to the objects of the elective will; it is supposed to
be a weakness. This misconception may be avoided by giving the name moral apathy
to that want of emotion which is to be distinguished from indifference. In the
former, the feelings arising from sensible impressions lose their influence on
the moral feeling only because the respect for the law is more powerful than all
of them together. It is only the apparent strength of a fever patient that makes
even the lively sympathy with good rise to an emotion, or rather degenerate into
it. Such an emotion is called enthusiasm, and it is with reference to this that
we are to explain the moderation which is usually recommended in virtuous
practices:
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 200}
Insani sapiens nomen ferat, aequus
uniqui
Ultra quam satis est virtutem si petat ipsam. *
* Horace. ["Let the wise man bear the
name of fool, and the just of unjust, if he pursue virtue herself beyond the
proper bounds."]
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 205}
For otherwise it is absurd to imagine
that one could be too wise or too virtuous. The emotion always belongs to the
sensibility, no matter by what sort of object it may be excited. The true
strength of virtue is the mind at rest, with a firm, deliberate resolution to
bring its law into practice. That is the state of health in the moral life; on
the contrary, the emotion, even when it is excited by the idea of the good, is a
momentary glitter which leaves exhaustion after it. We may apply the term
fantastically virtuous to the man who will admit nothing to be indifferent in
respect of morality (adiaphora), and who strews all his steps with duties, as
with traps, and will not allow it to be indifferent whether a man eats fish or
flesh, drink beer or wine, when both agree with him; a micrology which, if
adopted into the doctrine of virtue, would make its rule a tyranny.
REMARK
{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 210}
Virtue is always in progress, and yet always begins from the
beginning. The former follows from the fact that, objectively considered, it is
an ideal and unattainable, and yet it is a duty constantly to approximate to it.
The second is founded subjectively on the nature of man which is affected by
inclinations, under the influence of which virtue, with its maxims adopted once
for all, can never settle in a position of rest; but, if it is not rising,
inevitably falls; because moral maxims cannot, like technical, be based on
custom (for this belongs to the physical character of the determination of
will); but even if the practice of them become a custom, the agent would thereby
lose the freedom in the choice of his maxims, which freedom is the character of
an action done from duty.
ON_CONSCIENCE
ON CONSCIENCE
The consciousness of an internal
tribunal in man (before which "his thoughts accuse or excuse one another") is
CONSCIENCE.
Every man has a conscience, and finds himself observed by an
inward judge which threatens and keeps him in awe (reverence combined with
fear); and this power which watches over the laws within him is not something
which he himself (arbitrarily) makes, but it is incorporated in his being. It
follows him like his shadow, when he thinks to escape. He may indeed stupefy
himself with pleasures and distractions, but cannot avoid now and then coming to
himself or awaking, and then he at once perceives its awful voice. In his utmost
depravity, he may, indeed, pay no attention to it, but he cannot avoid hearing
it.
Now this original intellectual and (as a conception of duty)
moral capacity, called conscience, has this peculiarity in it, that although its
business is a business of man with himself, yet he finds himself compelled by
his reason to transact it as if at the command of another person. For the
transaction here is the conduct of a trial (causa) before a tribunal. But that
he who is accused by his conscience should be conceived as one and the same
person with the judge is an absurd conception of a judicial court; for then the
complainant would always lose his case. Therefore, in all duties the conscience
of the man must regard another than himself as the judge of his actions, if it
is to avoid self-contradiction. Now this other may be an actual or a merely
ideal person which reason frames to itself. Such an idealized person (the
authorized judge of conscience) must be one who knows the heart; for the
tribunal is set up in the inward part of man; at the same time he must also be
all-obliging, that is, must be or be conceived as a person in respect of whom
all duties are to be regarded as his commands; since conscience is the inward
judge of all free actions. Now, since such a moral being must at the same time
possess all power (in heaven and earth), since otherwise he could not give his
commands their proper effect (which the office of judge necessarily requires),
and since such a moral being possessing power over all is called GOD, hence
conscience must be conceived as the subjective principle of a responsibility for
one's deeds before God; nay, this latter concept is contained (though it be only
obscurely) in every moral self-consciousness.
THE END
